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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
October 29, 1982 Conference
List 3, Sheet 3
No. 82-401
RICE, (Dir. of Cal. Alcoholic Beverage
Control Dept.)

Cert to
CA9 (en banc) 1

v.
REHNER,

Federal/Civil

Timely

1 (Browning, Choy, Wallace, Kennedy, Tang, Farris, Pregerson,
Poole, Canby, Reinhardt: Goodwin, dissenting) The case was
consolidated below with two other cases arising in Washington.
Because those cases were remanded on another issue, the State of
Washington has not filed a petn, although it did submit an amicus
brief in support of California's petn.

-

1.

u.s.c.

_

SUMMARY:

...

-

was CA9 correct in holding that

n~Lther

18

S1161 nor the 21st Amendment make state laws, which

require liquor retailers to be licensed, applicable to Indian
~

reservations?
___,
2.

FACTS & DECISION BELOW:

Resp, a member of the Pala Band
-------,

of Mission Indians, is a federally licensed Indian trader who
operates a general store on

reservation in California.
--------_
.... She sought exemption from a California law requiring a state
the~ala

license for the retail sale of distilled spirits for off-premises
consumption.

Petr, the California Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage
-

~L.&-Lu,.._~

Control, rejected the request, ap~ently on the ground that
I{

state law did not permit any exemptions, and seems to have told
resp that she could not sell liquor without a license.

Resp

brought an action in federal DC seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, principally in the form of an order that she
did not need a license in order to sell liquor.

The DC dismissed

for failure to state a claim, apparently agreeing that California
law did not provide for exemptions, and that this law applied to
resp.
CA9, sitting en bane, reversed.

It began from the premise

that unless federal law gave the state power to require a
license, state law was irrelevant.
decision involved only 18

u.s.c.

The court thought its

Sl161, which provides,

[Federal statutes, e.g., 18 u.s.c. Sll54, creating criminal
liability for selling liquor in Indian country] shall not apply
within any area that js not Indian coun~ry, nor to any ac ~ or
transaction ~thin any area of Indian country provided such act
or transaction is in conformity both with the laws of the State
in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance
~

...

-

-

duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of
the Indian country ••••
Petr argued that §1161 explicitly required compliance with both
state law and Indian ordinances: since state law requires
licensing, those selling liquor in Indian country violate federal
law if they sell without a license.

Petr apparently did not

think that the case involved the question whether it could
enforce its liquor licensing laws within Indian country, and did
not argue this point.
CA9, in contrast, seems to have thought that the only issue

____,

~fi&:{

in the case was whether a state could enforce its laws within
Indian country.
-~

V?.~~
It concluded that on this question the statute - ~~

~

was ambiguous, and then resolved the ambiguity in accordance

with ~

a canon of statutory construction favoring Indians, citing
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian tribe, 435

u.s.

191, 208 n.l7

~
C L,t. ~ f j

(1978) , and a rule that "State laws generally are not applicable
to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress
has expressly provided that State laws shall apply."
Itasca County, 426

u.s.

Bryan v.

373, 392 (1976).
1

TheCA began by drawing a distinction ; which it returned to
It

,..

""

throughout the opinion, between licensing ana-aistribution laws

-

of the State and what it termed "substantive laws."

(The CA

offered virtually no explanation of what "substantive laws"
include, why this distinction follows from the statute or how
"substantive laws" differ from licensing and distribution laws,
see note 4 infra.).

''--

- 4 The CA first examined the language of §1161, and said that
if "laws of the State" included licensing laws, the statute would
create intolerable conflicts between state and tribal licensing
regulations, particularly in states that maintained a monopoly
over-- the sale of bottled liquor.

Congress therefore could never

have intended the phrase to include licensing.
The court also reasoned that, since the phrase "having
jurisdiction over such area of the Indian country" modified only
the phrase "ordinance duly adopted by the tribe" and not "laws of
the State", Congress must not have intended to give states
"jurisdiction" over liquor licensing.

This meant "the state [was

to] function[] only as the source of law to be applied by the
tribal government."

Petn App. at 15.

CA9 also looked at other ~ lated statutes and relevant
legislative history.

Relying on the Termination Acts, which

divested the federal government of many powers regarding some
Indian tribes and transferred such powers to the states, the
court reasoned that when Congress means to give the states
jurisdiction to regulate an area it used the word
"jurisdiction."2

The court concluded that because §1161 does

not explicitly provide that the states shall have jurisdiction to
regulate licensing and distribution Congress must be assumed not
2The authority cited by the CA was the language of 25 u.s.c.
§726 (1976), providing that "statutes of the United States
which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no
longer be applicable ••• and the laws of the several states shall
apply to the tribe and its members 1n the same manner as they
apply to other citizens or person within their jurisdiction."

- 5 f

to have intended this result.

It also relied on the fact that

the legislative history nowhere discussed liquor licensing and
distribution laws.
Next, the CA turned to Bryan v. Itasca County, 426
(197~),

u.s.

373

which interpreted a federal statute [Public Law 280

containing 18

u.s.c.

§1162 and 28

u.s.c.

S1360(a)] 3 conferring

civil and criminal jurisdiction on the states, as not also
conferring power to tax.

Bryan was read as creating a rule

favoring the denial to the states of general civil regulatory
powers in Indian country.

In addition, the CA noted that CAlO

had interpreted S1161 as not giving the states regulatory
authority over liquor transactions.

United States v. New Mexico,

590 F.2d 323 (CAlO 1978), cert. denied, 444

u.s.

832 (1979).

Finally, theCA rejected petr's reliance on the 21st
Amendment ("The transportation or importation into any State,

3Public Law 280 contains two sections relevant here. 28 u.s.c.
S1360(a) provides:
Each of the States ••• listed in the following table shall have
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to
which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian
country listed ••• to the same extent that such State ••• has
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil
laws of such State ••• that are of general application to private
persons or private property shall have the same force and effect
within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the
State ••••
18 u.s.c. S1162 provides:
Each of the States ••• listed in the following table shall have
jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the
areas of Indian country listed ••• to the same extent that such
State ••• has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere
within the State ••• and the criminal laws of such State •••
shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country
as they have elsewhere within the State ••••

-

6 -

Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereos, is hereby prohibited."). The court relied on United
States v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi, 421
14

(~975)

u.s.

599, 613-

(21st Amendment is inapplicable to military base over

which both US and state have jurisdiction), for the proposition
that in an area subject to both state and federal jurisdiction,
the 21st Amendment is inapplicable.
In its holding the CA said that resp need not obtain a state
liquor license, because Sll61 preempts state licensing and
distribution jurisdiction over tribal liquor sales in Indian
country.

The court refused to decide two questions, raised in

the cases consolidated below with this case, relating to the
(~

state's power to impose a sales tax on sales to non-Indians and
its power to impose record-keeping requirements on liquor sellers
in Indian country.

It remanded to the District Court for

consideration in light of Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Reservation, 447
A

~e

u.s.

134 (1980).

dissenting vote was cast by Judge Goodwin.

------------

He wrote

that until 1953 Indian country had been "dry" under federal law;
Section 1161 was intended to lift this prohibition -- provided
that the newly legalized transactions were consistent with state
law.

Under the majority decision, Indians become super citizens:

they may avoid paying monopoly prices in Wahington (which include
a 51% sales tax on liquor) or otherwise complying with state
liquor laws.

I

I

-

3.

CONTENTIONS:

I

-

Petr advances very few legal arguments.

California has been granted, under Public Law 280, 18

u.s.c.

Sll62(a) and 28

u.s.c.

S1360(a), see note 3 supra, civil and

criminal jurisdiction overs affairs occurring within Indian
reseEvations.

Under the court's decision, California may do

nothing to remedy traditional problems associated with the sale
and distribution of

liquor~

state standards"

which the CA never defines -- but it cannot

enforce these standards.

at most it may enact "substantive

Moreover, nothing in theCA's opinion

limits the holding to sales to non-Indians, even assuming, that
such a restriction could be enforced, which it could not because
of the interspersion of Indian and state lands in many areas of
California.
Petr also relies on the fact that traditional principles of
statutory construction favoring Indians, did not involve cases
where the 21st Amendment was implicated.

This Court should

decide how the Amendment affects these principles.
The State of Washington filed an amicus brief in support of
the petn.

It notes that Washington -- unlike California -- is

one of 18 states that allows sale of liquor by the bottle only
through state owned and operated stores.

The State interprets

S1161 as imposing dual requirements on liquor retailers: whatever
standards both the State and tribe think are necessary to protect
the public must be met.

If the two sets of requirements are

mutually inconsistent -- the State requires that liquor be
purchased only from the State and the tribe also requires

- 8 -

(

purchases only from it -- then §1161 cannot be satisfied, and the
sale of liquor in Indian country becomes a crime under §1154.
The State also argues that the CA's continued discussion of
"jurisdiction" is irrelevant.

It admits that §1161 has nothing

to do with a state's jurisdiction to enforce its laws on the
reservations.

Rather, the section only determines when an act

becomes a federal criminal violation -- that the federal
government has jurisdiction to prosecute.

The question whether

the states may enforce their liquor laws on the reservations is a
complex question determined by a number of factors such as the
effect of Public Law 280 and cases like Bryan v. Itasca County,
supra: Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, supra:

u.s.

313 (1978).

u.s.

v. Wheeler, 435

The states, however, may enforce their laws

through off-reservation action.
Resp argues first that California has acquiesced in CA9's
decision by passing a law allowing liquor wholesalers to sell to
non-state-licensed retail liquor stores in Indian country.
Further, there is no conflict: CA9 and CAlO are the only courts
to have passed on the preemptive effect of §1161, and they agree.
None of the practical problems warned of by petr have come to
pass, and this Court should wait until they do before acting.
The only real result of the decision below is that liquor
retailers will pay the tribe their fee, rather than the State.
Finally, resp argues that petr did not raise its
constitutional claim below, and that, even if it did, that claim
is frivolous.
(

~

(Resp concedes that Washington, rather than petr,

did raise the issue below.)

The 21st Amendment is not applicable

-

-;,

-

c:U ~~..it- Uf

to the power of states to deal with liquor issues outside their

~~

jurisdictions, United States v. Mississippi Tax Commission, 421
U.S. 599, 613-14 (1975)1 Collins v. Yosemite Park & C~~
: ~r~~E·,

~

U.S. 518, 538 (1938).

0

In Collins this Court held

that when the US has exclusive jurisdiction

as in a fedral

park -- the 21st Amendment is inapplicable, and in Mississippi
Tax Commission, this rule of inapplicability was extended to
areas where state and federal jurisdiction is concurrent.

Prior

to passage of §1161 and Public Law 280, federal jurisdiction over
Indian reservations was exclusive: the constitutional question
here is therefore dependent on the statutory issue, namely, did
the federal government give the states liquor licensing
jurisdiction?

If not, as the CA held, then the 21st Amendment

gives the states no added power.

(."'---

4. DISCUSSION:

OWing to its procedural history,

described below, this ~se is very confusing.

The ~whose

opinion is not in the papers, apparently held that §1161 required
resp to operate with a state license, and that her complaint
seeking declaratory judgment that she did not need a state liquor
license failed to state a
reading of §1161.

claim. ~reversed because of its

It held that "so long as [resp] complies with

the certified tribal ordinance authorized by 18

u.s.c.

§1161, she

need not obtain a California license to sell liquor in Indian
country."

i~s

This holding disposes of two completely separate

raised by §1161.

federal crime, under 18

Th~~~~t is~ is
u.s.c.

elte:r5

~
liquor ~

whether it is a

§1154 (forbidding sale of

in Indian country) and Sl161 (creating exemptions to that

f-w-o

prohibition), to operate a liquor store on a reservation without
a state-required license.
544 (1975).

See United States v. Mazurie, 419

u.s.

CA9's holding, quoted above, necessarily disposes of

this issue: if it is a federal crime then it is not correct that
resp _"need not obtain a California liquor license."

~ss~disposed
gives a

st~t~

of by the CA's holding · is

~heth~r

---

The ~ nd

federal law

jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce liquor

licensing
statutes on Indian reservations.
'The CA's decision seems to have answered both these questions
in the negative, since it polds that Sll61 does not require resp
""--

to get a liquor license.

~1-q

Yet, the first question was not almost

~

--~

certainly not ripe for decision since there is no hint in the
papers that the US ever intended to prosecute resp.

In addition,

there is no indication that the US was represented below, which

~
~

~

~

seems odd given CA9's interpretation of §1161 and the fact

tha ~the constitutionality of a federal statute was challenged.
As to the correctness of the CA's resolution of this
firs?4uestion, the language of Sll61 -- making federal criminal
penalties for

~elling ~~~]inapplicable

if "such act or

transaction is in conformity both with the laws of the State in
which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly
adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of the
Indian country" -- seems clear on its face.

violate federal law, unless they obey

liquor
state liquor laws.

t~

Persons selling

It seems indisputable -- and everyone seems

some sort of state liquor law must apply to

Indian country: otherwise, Sll61 has no meaning.

~

~A~jj~;
~~

The CA relied

~

M.t

~UAI~

~ ,__,fa..ti .i.,d<.- ~

C-ltCf~
throughout its opinion on a distinction between licensing
./\.
requirements and "substantive law," which is neither suggested
- 11 -

---.

by

the language of the statute nor the legislative history, Petn
App. at 20, or explained by the court. 4 This distinction is
cen ~l ·~- ~ i~ e, however, since

without it the court would be left holding that no state law
applies.

As noted above, this is untenable.

It is difficult, however, to see a principled basis for
drawing the distinction created by the CA.

Even ignoring the

lack of statutory authority, or legislative history, it is
unclear why hours of operation are different from licensing
requirements, but the CA finds the former applicable and the
latter inapplicable, see note 4 supra.

As washington points out,

there is nothing particularly unusual about requiring the
4The only hint that CA9 gives of what "substantive law" is,
comes in a characterization of petr's theory of the case which
includes the phrase "substantive standards such as hours of
operation and legal age for consumption." The term might also
include things like labelling requirements and adulteration laws,
but this is speculation.
A possible explanation for the source of the distinction
lies in Tulalip Ordinance No. 43, §12, dealing with sales of
liquor on the Tulalip reservation. This reservation was involved
in one of the cases consolidated with the present case below:
that case was remanded on other issues, and is not before the
Court. The Tulalip ordinance says that "the substantive laws of
the State of Washington" apply within the reservation. Petn App.
at 39 n.4. If no state law applies to Indian country by virtue
of §1161, then this ordinance would incorporate state law to
serve as tribal law. But, even if this is correct, it is
irrelevant to our case, which deals with a different reservation.
The CA did not quote the Pala reservation ordinance, but
described it as providing "that such sales were in conformity
with the laws of California." Petn App at 2. Nobody seems to
have argued that the ordinance -- which presumably binds resp
incorporates all state law, including licensing requirements.

.....

-~-

~--

licensing requirements of two entities to be satisfied.

The CA

seems to have rested on the fact that some states -- like
Washington -- have liquor monopolies.

This would require actual

state operation of storeswithin Indian country, which conceivably
migh~

be sufficient basis for treating state-owned and operated

stores differently under §1161, despite the absence of any
express language to this effect.

However, the petn deals only

with California, which is not a monopoly state, so this argument
does not appear to help resp.

In short, I am unpersuaded by the

licensing/substantive law distinction and without this CA9's
opinion, as it relates to the existence of a federal crime, seems
fatally flawed.
In addition, it is not clear that ordinary principles of
statutory construction favoring Indian self-government apply in
full force here.

These canons are considerably diluted when "the

application of state laws to tribal Indians who have left or
never inhabited federally established reservations, or Indians
'who do not possess the usual accoutrements of tribal selfgovernment'"

Bryan v. Itasca County, 426

u.s.

at 376 n.2.

The

present situation, where Indians have never been permitted even
to purchase liquor, much less to regulate its distribution, seems
analogous.

--

In summary, there are substantial arguments that CA9's
resolution of the first issue described above was wrong.
additiion, it is unclear why CA9 decided this question.

There is

no indication in the papers that the US ever considered
prosecution, and the dispute between petr and resp could have

- 13 been resolved solely on the basis of the second question by
holding that the state could not enforce its licensing laws on
the reservation.

The most likely explanation is that the CA's

holding was merely worded too broadly, and that the court did not
intend to dispose of a question not before it.

-

Th~ond que ~

apparently decided by CA9 is
I l

whe~her

\'

§1161, together with other statutes, grants states power to
,

prescribe and enforce liquor licensing laws in Indian country.
These appear to be considerably more difficult issues than the
question of what constitutes a federal crime under §1161.

CA9's

argument that §1161 alone does not grant such prescription and
enforcement authority is persuasive, particularly if the
traditional principles of statutory construction are given full
force.

The reason for this, however, is that ~has very

~
little to do with giving states such author1ty.

Rather, the

source of such authority lies in other federal statutes, such as
Public Law 280 (18

u.s.c.

Sll62(a) and 28

u.s.c.

Sl360(a)), which

give states criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian country,
see note 3 supra.

Unfortunately, the parties entirely missed one

another on this point in the proceedings below.

The states seem

to believe that Public Law 280 would provide the basis for such
jurisdiction, but did not advance these arguments in the CA, see
Petn App. at 41 n.l2, because they thought, and at least
Washington appears still to think, that their enforcement powers
under these laws are not involved in this case.
Amicus Brief at 16-17.

Washington

CA9, on the other hand, believed that

this question was the principal one in the case.

It did not,

-

.L4

-

however, address whether Public Law 280 grants the states
enforcement and prescription jurisdiction because it thought the
states had abandoned these arguments, Petn App. at 41 n.l2.
When Public Law 280 is considered I think a good case can be
made- that the states covered by the statute (this includes
.....

~____......___---

California) have been granted liquor licensing enforcement
authority.

-----._.,.

Section 1360(a), 28

u.s.c.,

provides that specified

states "shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action
between Indians or to which Indians are parties ••• to the same
extent that such State ••• has jurisdiction over other civil
causes of action, and those civil laws of such State ••• that are
of general application to private persons or private property
shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country
as they have elsewhere within the State •••• "

Considering only

the statutory language, it would be easy to conclude that "civil
laws" includes liquor licensing laws and that "civil causes of
action" includes enforcement actions under those laws.

Bryan

overcame this language, however, in refusing to conclude that the
section gave states the power to impose property taxes on Indians
on reservations.

The reasoning of Bryan could well be extended

to this case, although a fair distinction could be based on the
fact that where liquor is involved Congress may have intended to
give the States greater power than in other areas of civil
regulation.

Certainly Bryan's concern that permitting States to

tax Indians would destroy existing tribal self-government is not
implicated in this area, since Indians historically did not have
any role in the regulation of liquor.

The question whether

-

.1::>

-

Public Law 280 permits states to prescribe and enforce liquor
(..__

licensing laws in Indian country therefore seems to be a
substantial one.
In summary, the issues involved are of considerable public
L------>
....___
importance. The decision below is problematic in two respects.
First, its resolution of what §1161 makes a federal crime is
questionable, both procedurally and substantively.

Although this

would suggest a grant, the interlocutory nature of the
proceedings and the fact that the CA's holding on this issue is
not entirely clear cut against such action.
to see whether the decision concerns the

us.

I recommend CVSGing,
Second, CA9's

treatment of the states' enforcement powers is more persuasive,

-

but only because the states did not argue, and the CA did not
(

need to address, statutes that are relevant to this question.
Although cert was denied in United States v. New Mexico, 590 F.2d
323 (1978) , where

~10 held that §1161 and other federal statutes

did not give states enforcement power over their liquor licensing
laws, that case did not involve a state given jurisdiction over
Indian country by Public Law 280, see Petn App at 42 n.l7.
on the Public Law even as interpreted

i~

Based

Bryan, I think there is

a substantial question as to the correctness of the result
reached below.

Since the states did not rely on the statute

below, however, it does not appear that they could do so here.
(I think a fair reading of the petn, p. 10, is that it raises the
question.

The "Question Presented" do not, because of the

rhetorical characterization of Sll61 by petr.) If ordinary
principles requiring the raising of issues below are relaxed,

-

1.6 -

either because of the confusing procedural development of the
(

case or the because the question of what §1161 means fairly
subsumes issues relating to the meaning of other related federal
statutes, I would recommend considering a grant.
-- The 21st Amendment issue seems to depend on whether the

/

~

fed~-nl gove~e~has -2_u':_is~~_:_r~ ~ ~~~stion, ~
which petr and Washington appear to concede.
on this.

I recommend denying

(The papers do not indicate whether the AG was notified

that the action below involved a challenge to the
constitutionality of a federal statute.)

There is a response and an amicus in support of the petn.
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82-402

of Alcoholic

California)

v. Rehner
This is a summary memo to file.
good

preliminary

look

at

the

briefs,

Having taken a
I

will

merely

summarize my view of the better arguments on each side.
Respondent, Eve Rehner,

is a member of the Pala

tribe and operates a store within the reservation.

In a

general sense, the question is whether she must obtain a
state license to sell intoxicating beverages (liquor).
The

tribe

(called

the

Pala

Band)

adopted

an

ordinance permitting the sale of

intoxicating beverages.

The

the

ordinance

Interior,

and

was

approved

therefore

-

by

according

Secretary

of

to the SG -

she is

"licensed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs".
The Statute (18

u.s.c.

1161

The SG (br. p. 1) describes §1161 as follows:
"[It]
exempts
from
an array of otherwise
applicable federal criminal proscriptions [with
respect to the sale of liquor in Indian country]
any transaction 'in conformity both with the
laws of the state in which it occurs and with an
ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having
jurisdiction over [the Indian country] certified
by the Secretary of the Interior.'"
The SG states the bottom line question as:

the

....

"Whether this statute grants state government
the power to require tribal Indians that intend
to sell alcoholic beverages on trust lands
within
a
reservation,
pursuant
to
tribal
authorization, to secure a state license." (br.
p. 1) •
The Court of Appeals

(CA9)

summarized §1161 as

permitting "reservation sales of liquor by Indian tribes
when

such

sales

tribal laws".
The

do

not

otherwise

contravene

(3A)
state

of

California's

state

or

~
s-tate-s that

brief

§1161 requires that liquor traffic be "in conformity , bot_h
with the laws of the state
adopted by the tribe .

.

and an ordinance duly

.

"

Both sides rely on the "plain language" of the
statute.

I

agree

with

CA9

that,

at

least

the correct

interpretation of the statute is ambiguous.
The

state

also

relies

upon

its

special

power

under the 21st Amendment.

Petitioner's Argument
Petitioner

(the

state)

argues

that

the

requirement that a liquor license be in conformity "both
with the laws of the state .

. and with tribal law (an

J.

ordinance

duly adopted) ,

means what

The term "laws" means all laws,
requires a

liquor license.

this

language says.

including state law that

It cites Maine v.

Thiboutot

where the Court construed the term in §1983 as meaning all
laws - not just some subset of laws.

Moreover ~if

§1161

is

not construed

affirmative grant of state authority or
license

Indian

liquor

to

be an

jurisdiction to

~~~//~[

dealers,

nGr

goes

statute

the

1\

prohibit the right to license.
The
Amendment,
liquor

state

granting

traffic.

also

relies

authority

If

there

strongly

to

is

a

the

on

states

conflict

the

21st

to control
between

the

Amendment and the right of Indians to govern themselves,
the Amendment controls.
The
distinction

Court

between

of

Appeals

purported

"substantive

state

law"

to

drawn

and

a

"state

licensing" jurisdiction, but CA9 did not clearly describe

------

what it meant by "substantive".
distinction,

however

will create confusion.

it

The state argues that the

is described

is

impractical and

See p. 67 et seq. of its brief.

Argument of the United States
The

SG's

brief

strongly

supports

affirmance,

though it seems to do so primarily on policy grounds.
argues

that

§1161

"does

jurisdiction

over

tribal

"laws"

as

CA9

not

grant

the

Indians",

held

state

and

refers

that

to

It

licensing
the

term

substantive

as

distinguished from licensing laws.
The

SG

consistently
regulatory
refers

says

interpreted
licensing

to

that

an

opinion

§1161

power
of

the
as

over

the

United
not

States

granting

tribal

"has
states

Indians".

Solicitor

of

the

He

Interior

Department in 1971, and to the position taken by the U.S.
in

the

New

government.
be

Mexico case

in

which

CAlO

agreed

with

U.S. v. New Mexico, 590 F. 2d 323.

expected,

the

SG

relies

heavily

on

the

the

As would
fact

that

respondent had been duly licensed by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and had acted pursuant to a duly enacted tribal
ordinance.
Policy
the

operation

of

considerations
tourist

support

attractions

CA9's

decision:

contribute

to

the

economy of the tribes, and should not be hampered by state
licensing restrictions.

~/ ~~

/A;~~)~~~~
~~-F~~

~kd~~~.

:J •

Respondent's

brief

makes

many

of

the

same

arguments.

* * *
The case

is

a

close one

for

me.

I

voted

to

deny, though I was puzzled by the distinction drawn by CA9
between

"substantive"

licensing.
ambiguous,
state.

~

s

and

a

state

Despite the view of CA9
the

"plain language

law

that

requires

that the statute is
seems to

favor

~~~
&-7-~/1-7.

I have not mentioned

respect to the 21st Amendment.

Probably the SG is right

in saying that it applies only to the states, and does not
inhibit federal regulation of Indian tribes.

L • .F.P., Jr.

ss

82-401 Rice v. Rehner. As you know Indian law is
almost as inscrutable to me as nuclear physics.

I neverthe-

less am inclined to think that the SG is right in this case.
He states that the only question presented is whether a
state has authority to require a tribal Indian or a tribal
entity to obtain a state liquor license for the privilege of
operating a liquor store
clined to think that
authorizes or grants
in view of my own inexpertise, a brief bobtail memo would be
welcome.

G,-y~-~

~

~~~~~

5~~~

,~~

men
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 82-401:
Rice v. Rehner
.From:

Mark

March 18, 1983

Questions Presented
1. Whether the Twenty-First Amendment authorizes the States

-

to license the sale of liquor by tribal Indians on Indian reservat ions.
2. Whether 18

u.s.c.

§1161 authorizes the States to license

these sales.

·.:..

2.

I. Background
The issue is the power of a State to regulate the sale of
alcohol on Indian reservations.

There are several federal statue:;

tory provisions imposing criminal penalties on persons introducing

intoxicating liquors

U.S.C. §1156.

into "Indian country."

-

But 18 U.S.C §1161 states that

-

visions shall not apply

---

--

......

See,

e.g.,

18

thes~ pro-

"to any act or transaction within any area of
Indian country provided~ h ac ~ r transact ion i e in conf Q rm ~ ty
oth wi t 6.tt he laws of
the State i n- w~ h sue
act or transactions
occurs and wit~ n ordinance dul y adopted by
the tr i be having JUr i s (hct i on over SUCh area
of Indian country ..•• "
Resp is a member of the Pala Band of Mission Indians in San
Diego County, California.

She operates a general store on a res-

ervation, pursuant to a trading license issued by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs.

See 25

u.s.c.

§261.

The Pala Band has adopted

an ordinance, approved by the Secretary of the Interior, Eermitting sale of liquor on the reservation.

-

She sought an exemption

~

from the State of California's liquor licensing requirement.
license costs $6,000, with a $350 annual fee.
limited number per county.
alleges

that

(A

There are only a

::5 hd.o..

Licenses are transferable, and resp
.I\.
the market price of a license is about $55,000.)

Petr, head of the State Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
told her she had to get a license.
Resp brought suit in S.D. Cal.
tive relief.

The DC dismissed the complaint.

bane, reversed.
Washington.)

for declaratory and injuncCA9, sitting en

(The court consolidated this case with one from

Judge Tang, joined by 9 judges, held that §1161 did

~

~

~

..
'

3.

not

confer

licensing

jurisdiction

on

the

States.

The

phrase

"laws of the State" in the statute referred only to "state standards

of conduct."

(Pet.

at

18-A.)

state licensing jurisdiction.

(Id., at 27-A.)

21st Amendment did not authorize
"so long as

[resp]

Therefore,

§1161 preempts
Furthermore, the

such licensing.

Accordingly,

complies with the certified tribal ordinance

.•• , she need not obtain a California license."
Judge Goodwin dissented,

(I d. , at 3 6 -A. )

arguing that the purpose of §1161 was

only to permit Indians to be treated as other citizens, not to
give them special rights.
Following

CA9' s

decision,

California

amended

its

laws

to

permit licensed wholesalers to sell to nonlicensed retailers on
Indian land.

The law does not authorize retail sales by nonli-

censed Indians, and thus the case is not moot.
This Court unfortunately granted cert.
has filed a

brief supporting resp,

The

United States

as have five Indian Tribes.

Various States have filed briefs supporting petr.

II. Discussion
The policy issue raised in this case is important:
reconcile

the States'

broad authority

to regulate the sale of

liquor with the self-government of Indian Tribes.
issue in this case is narrow:
state

law,

require

how to

may the States,

But the legal
'-=

as a matter of

traders on Indian reservations to obtain a

state license to sell alcohol.

I think it clear that no provi-

sion of law authorizes the States to impose this state-law requirement on Indian Tribes.

I recommend affirmance.

cr-·

TZu. ~

4.
A

The

analysis

begins with

a

clear

principle:

"State

generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian
ervation except where Congress has expressly provided that State
laws shall apply."

u.s.

164, 170-171

McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm 1 n, 411
(1973).

For example, a State lacks authority

to license the sale of cigarettes on reservations.

Confederated

Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 425 U.S 463 (1976).

In the ab-

sence of some authorizing law, therefore, the States may not regulate liquor on reservations.
B

One

possible

source

of

authority

Section 2 of that Amendment states:

is

the

21st Amendment.

"The transportation or im-

portation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United
States

for delivery or

use therein of

intoxicating liquors,

violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."

in

In my view

the Amendment does not confer on the States any regulatory jurisdiction over Indian Tribes.

---

Amendment

may have

increased

[commerce in liquor]
tion.

1

"

(1938).

The governing princi:p_le is that "the

••. ,

[but]

1

the

state 1 s

power

to deal

with

it did not increase its · jurisdic-

Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304

u.s.

518, 538

Thus, the grant of power under the 21st Amendment may be

used with respect

to Indian Tribes only if the States have an

independent source of regulatory jurisdiction.

c
Petr 1 S central argument is that §1161 authorizes the States
to impose their liquor regulations on Indian Tribes.

..

He contends

T~

5.

that the plain language of §1161 requires sales on reservations
to he conducted "in conformity ... with the laws of the State,"
and this necessarily includes licensing laws.

CA9 rejected this

construction, holding that the phrase merely incorporated, as a
matter of federal law, the State's
I

find

this

dispute

over

substantive standards.

the

meaning

phrase to be irrelevant in this case.
§1161 authorizes state regulation.
does not.
alties

this

statutory

The only issue is whether
It

is clear

to me that it

Section §1161 merely states that federal criminal pen-

will not be

conform

of

to

certain

imposed where liquor sales on reservations
The

requirements.

provision

about what a State may do as a matter of state law.

says

nothing

It therefore

hardly can be said to "authorize" state licensing of reservation
liquor sales.

Even if the phrase "laws of the States" does in-

clude licensing laws, the most §1161 would do is permit a federal
criminal

pros.e cut ion against an Indian who sells alcohol on a

reservation without a state license.

It would not provide any

authority for a State to require, as a matter of state law, that
the seller obtain a license.
Once the case is viewed in this light, the policy arguments
made

in

the case become

irrelevant.

For

example,

petr argues

that while federal criminal penalties may be effective in enforcing a flat ban on all liquor
enforcing

in Indian country, they would not

work

in

comprehensive

liquor

regulations:

criminal

laws

"operate too slowly and cannot adapt to the ever-changing

market place," and they are "wholly inappropriate in many situations where violations are slight."

(Pet. at 79.)

This argument

6.

has merit,

but as policy, not law.

The fact that Congress may

have chosen a poor means of implementing its legislative intent
does not mean that this Court should rewrite the statute.
Note that under my analysis CA9's opinion is troublesome in
a couple of respects.
------------~

~

First,

the court erred

§1161 "preempted" state licensing.

the~ates

and

in finding

that

The proper analysis is that

have no general authority to regulate liquor sales,

therefore that "preempt ion"
-----..--~

is unnecessary.

-

Rather,

there

~-------~~----------ional authorization of state regulatory

----------------~r-~------------jurisdiction.
of

/1

~ at

§1161 actually means.

the State may not require,

-1 icense.
'-"

~

-obtain a

•\

The only holding necessary is that

as a matter of state law,

----

that resp

..-

This case does not present any issue as to

what standards resp must meet to avoid federal prosecution.
D

A final possible basis of authority for States to enforce

----

their liquor regulations is P.L.

280.

{Petr has not relied on

this, but I discuss it briefly because it is mentioned in several
briefs.)

This law gives specified States {including California)

jurisdiction to impose their general criminal and civil laws on
reservation Indians.
Bryan v.

See 18

Itasca County 426

u.s.c.

u.s.

§262,

28

u.s.c.

§1360.

In

373 {1976), the Court held that

§1360 did not "confer general state civil regulatory control over
Indian reservations."

Id., at 384.

Under this holding, P.L. 280

cannot be construed as giving States authority to impose their
liquor

licensing

requirements on

Indians.

Perhaps,

as

the

SG

suggests, P.L. 280 may permit a State to enforce its substantive

?

7.
liquor standards (e.g., a ban on sale of liquor to minors) either
through state criminal prosecutions or as rules of decision in
private civil actions.

Brief for SG at 26.

But the only ques-

tion here is whether the State can require resp to get a license.
Nothing in P.L. 280 authorizes a State to do so. ~ ~
~

III. Conclusion
I

-------

recommend affirmance on a narrow basis:

no general

regulatory authority over

(i)

a State has

Indian reservations;

the 21st Amendment provides no such authority;

and

(iii)

(ii)
§1161

provides no such authority, but merely concerns the standards for
federal criminal prosecutions.
The many policy issues raised and debated in the briefs are
simply not presented here -- and it is to be hoped that they will
never

be

presented

here,

but

rather

will be

resolved

through

agreement between States and Tribes and/or through congressional
legislation.
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JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

March 26, 1983

No. 82-401

Rice v. Rehner

Dear Lewis,
My basic view in this case is that although there is a
canon of construction to the effect that a grant of
jurisdiction to the State requires an explicit statement
from Congress, it seems that this canon, like all canons of
construction, is useful when we have no indication of
congressional intent. In this case, I think that we do know
what Congress intended, and the utility of the canon is
diminished to that degree.
The Senate Report on §1161 is useful in at least three
respects.
First, it indicates that the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs believed that §1161 empowered
"a State or local municipality . • . to restrict the sales
of intoxicants to Indians."
S. Rep. 722, 83rd Cong., 1st
Sess.
(1953).
Second, the Report indicates that §1161
started off as a measure applicable only to Arizona.
The
Senate Committee recommended that the statute have general
application.
Arizona was not one of the States covered by
the simultaneously enacted PL 280.
Therefore, if, as the
Senate Report indicates, Congress intended to empower States
to "restrict" sales if they so decided, then it had to be
the case that they intended this to be done through §1161
because very few states had, and have, power under PL 280.
Third, the Senate Report indicates that the purpose of §1161
was to remove discrimination against Indians.
If we
interpret §1161 in the way that the respondent suggests,
then the effect will be not only to remove discrimination,
but also to provide a clear preference for Indians by
exempting them from requirements imposed on all others in
the State. In addition, the effect of a decision adverse to
the petitioner would be particularly troubling in those
States that have monopoly control over liquor. For example,
Washington has made contraband all liquor not purchased
through its monopoly scheme.
If Indians alone can buy and
import at market prices any liquor that they desire, then
Indians are given a considerable advantage that I doubt
Congress intended to provide to them in light of the desire
merely to remove discrimination.

.
2.

In addition to the Senate Report, the interpretation
given to §1161 from 1953 to 1971 by the Department of the
Interior was consistent with the petitioner's view. During
congressional hearings on §1161, then-Commissioner of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs Dillon Myer was asked whether the
statute should include a statement that §1161 did not affect
any state laws.
In response, Commissioner Myer explained
that "[w] e certainly do not intend to try to revise State
laws regarding Indians or anyone else, and it should be
clear that is provided.
[The statute does not]
interfere with State laws." Brief for Petr, Vol. I I, at A26, A-27.
A 1954 Opinion of the Solicitor of the Interior
indicated clearly that the Solicitor thought that States
were able to impose their licensing requirements.
The
Opinion was issued in response to the views of the Attorney
General of California, and the Solicitor opined that the
State may "license sales of liquor on such reservation for
consumption both on and off the premises where the liquor is
sold." A copy of the opinion is enclosed. The 1958 Federal
Indian Handbook, published by the Government and approved by
the Secretary of the Interior, relied on this 1954 Opinion
and stated that "a State license to sell for consumption on
the premises will give protection only against State
prosecutions but not against Federal prosecutions under
section
1156."
Id.,
at
383
(emphasis
added) •
The
implication here is that the Secretary of the Interior was
of the view that the States could enforce their licensing
requirements.
It is ironic that the SG relies on a quote
from another portion of this same 1958 edition of the
Handbook to establish and support the proposition that a
grant of jurisdiction to the States must be explicit. See
Brief for the SG, at 8.
It appears to me that what was
required in 1958 to satisfy the requirement of an explicit
grant of state jurisdiction was somewhat less than what this
Court has required more recently.Although a 1971 Opinion of
the Solicitor of the Interior indicated that the States
could not impose their licensing requirements, I feel that
the early practice is surely relevant to a determination of
what Congress intended, especially when the Secretary
espoused this view in congressional hearings before the
statute was enacted.

I
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3.

It seems to me a creditable op1n1on could be written for
application of state liquor licensing regulations.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

.
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'I so much appreciate your taldnq the time - busy
as we all are .;;.. to outline how you thought a reversal of CA9
could be written.
''

There is no doubt in my min~ as to the s~nsibl~
resolut'on of this case. It makes little sense to have liquor stores operating in a state purquant to different and
probably conflicting regulations. Yet, I qtill find it ~if
ficult to conclude that §1161 actually qrantP~ authortty tn
the states to enforce their requlations. tt may he that
~1161 fairly can be read to make it a federal crime to sell"'
liquor on a reservation without a state license. Such a
reading would not confer ;my indeoendent authoritv on the "
state.
itt'' ~};;,.:· ~.\.'f1;."'.
r~:,r ~"!
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, f~··.:~l:Pav i ng said a1l of this, r
res~; ~ ~nd . will await the writing.
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~ -.i~

·" ,~,~~· "
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h' k;

d~:~1~ f~~nk you.
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'~Jbwqmgfun. ~CHAMBERS OF

20giJ!~

April 2, 1983

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

<!J.

RICE v. REHNER
~82-401

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
At Conference I voted to affirm in this close case,
but my further consideration leads me to make my vote
to reverse.
Dividing the regulation of liquor ·dispensing
between a State and the Indians, even with the Secretary
of Interior as a "monitor" does not "wash."
My vote is to reverse.
Regards,

<qcttrl cf flrt 'J!fui:ttb jtaU$
Jfa,glfi:ngtcn. ~. <q. 20~~~ '

j;ttp"ttntt

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE

w .. .

I

..J . BRENNAN , ..JR.

April 4, 1983

Re:

No. 82-401 -- Rice v. Rehner

Dear Thurgood, Harry and Lewis,
We four are in dissent in the
above.

Lewis, will you take on the

dissent?
Sincerely,

. .,
l;\ \ \
)

I

Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell

c:; ,

,I

];.

think vour not:~s •-11i 11 show, my vote in this '·' "
case was tentatlve. I have no doubt as to the desirability
of a unifoyrn system of statewide regulation of liquor
stores. I therefore heve gaid to Sandra, who feels verv
.
Strongly at"lout. thic:!. Ca,!=:f' 1 that. ! '•10Uld try t.O be open minded &,
about what she writes for the Court. '
f· •
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~ut T hetve not v~t foun~ it ~">asv to r ad the st.At-
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license and requl;:~te the.se storec;. ~--·"
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these' ci rcum~tances, ' ' f yo'u "1i sh mE> to do so
\-dll be happv t .o trv my hand at a memorani!um of dissent • .I
Sandra should persuade me, my mP.mC'Irandum, of course, would '
be available to you, . Thurqoo~ and HPrry.
tt,:~·
J
'
'
"''"'-'I· -. ~ .
.
~
· "'}'J. T al1\ a bit "st-acked up" at the moment-·~ but if the
preoaratfon of a memorandum is satisfactory, I · ~il.J qladly
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From: Mark
Re:

Rice v.

I
case.

have

Rehn~,

No. 82-401

reviewed Justice

0' Connor's

draft

opinion

in

this

I also have talked about it with Jim (with respect to con-

sistency with Justice Marshall's Mescalero opinion) and clerks in
other chambers.

My view is that I am now genuinely uncertain as

to the proper outcome of the case.

If we had not been assigned

the dissent, I would simply propose awaiting it.

In view of your

strong inclination to the disposition reached by SOC, however, I
think you should join.
The basic discussion of "Indian law" in the beginning generally tracks the discussion in Mescalero.
chambers attempted to coordinate this.)
points, but nothing major.
way --

(i)

(I understand the two
There is some tension at

There are two trends in the law any-

deference to tribal sovereignty (and thus an assump-

tion that state laws do not apply absent clear congressional intent), and

(ii) search for congressional preemption (and thus an

assumption that state laws do apply unless there is preemption) - and these opinions do not substantially change this.
SOC decides

that

in view of

the history of total federal

control over liquor on reservations, there is no inherent tribal
sovereignty

interest

in

liquor

regulation.

I

am not yet con-

vinced this is correct -- it seems that an argument can be made
that this is an unduly restrictive view of tribal sovereignty --

'·

,.

I' •

2.
but the history of liquor regulation certpinly is unique.
Thus, at bottom this remains a fact-bound case involving the
unusual situation of liquor licensing.

And I think SOC has done

as good a job as possible in finding support in the legislative
history

for

the

view that Congress

permit States to apply their
tions.

really

intended

that

§1161

licensing laws to Indian reserva-

There also are two contemporaneous DOI opinions that as-

sume this answer.

Finally, she provides a plausible (though not

entirely convincing} explanation of why §1161 may be read as more
than just an exception to federal criminal liability:
out

that

the

(1974},

as

fairly,

why

same

section

delegating

was

liquor

if §1161 delegates

read

in Mazur ie,

authority

to

she points

419

Tribes.

authority to Tribes

U.S.
SOC

544

asks,

it may not

also delegate authority to States.
A dissent would have to rely heavily on the canon of construction that we assume that state laws do not apply to tribal
Indians unless Congress expressly so provides.
would have

to challenge SOC's

To argue this, we

basic reading of

Indian law.

A

reasonable argument can still be made on this point, but I am not
sure it is more persuasive than the other side.
Given that there is a reasonable argument for SOC's opinion,
I see no reason for you to dissent.
is

hard

to

believe

that

Congress

Her basic point is that it
really

intended

to

prohibit

state liquor licensing on reservations -- and that is your view.

:;~~

men

05/27/83

MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE

POWELL ~~

From: Mark
Re:

_R_ic_e_ v.

R~hner,

82-401 --Draft Letter to WJB (cc: TM, HAB)

I have reviewed Sandra's opinion in this case, and I am inclined to join.
As you will recall, my vote to affirm always has been tentative.

I found it difficult to believe that Congress in 1954 in-

tended to prevent the States from regulating liquor sales on Indian reservations.

But because of the peculiar nature of the

statute in this case -- seeming to create only an exception to
federal criminal liability -- I had difficulty finding the source
of state authority.
After

reading Sandra's draft,

join in voting to reverse.

however,

I

am persuaded to

The history that she details is con-

vincing that Indian Tribes never have possessed inherent authority over liquor sales and that in 1954 the Congress believed that
such sales on reservations would be subject to the same state
laws as all liquor sales.
I apologize for

"jumping ship" after having been assigned

the dissent.

<_ '

;§n:pr.enu Qf01trlllf tlr.t~mu~ ,®tattg

:Jfan-lfhtghm. ~. Qf.

20&T'!.1

CHAMB E RS Of'

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 27, 1983

~

Re:

82-401 - Rice v. Rehner

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference

-.-

<qamt of tltt ~tb ~hdtg
~as!ytngton. ~. <!f. 21lc?J.I.~

~u.prtmt

CHAM BER S OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . R E HNQUIST

May 27, 1983
Re:

No. 82-401

....

Rice v. Rehner

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~

I
I

I

1

'I

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

. ''

,,

,r
'\

Dear

~· ..
,

~\{:

~N1r,,

"'

:·

~
'!\.

~··

my , letter>'• to you
5 , responding to your ''
inquiry whether I would draft a dissent for t he four of us
who voted that way, I recorned my ,c loubt as to th.e · proper :·,:·
disposition ~f th~s cas • ·
't·J,:'';~
:::,

!11.'

' ·..

;;<•

'·"'t,

Sandra's opinion , circulated ~1ay 26, is per sua-.,",,,,
sive . She details history that is rather convincing that
Indian · Tribes never possessed inherent authority over liquor
sales, and that in 1954 Congress believed that such sales on
reser~ations would be subject to the same stat~ laws as all ~
liquor sales." This makes a go0d rleal, of sense to ,me . In a r·
word , 1 think,. I could ·join SandrE\ .
',;:.', ·~
..:.·;:··'
i ,,:
b

~ ,;~";.').• ~

L•

"')

;<:

.;

~).

\1:

~~)

r,"',,::.
Neverthel~ss, I recognize t't!~'t the question is
close, and I volunteeren in my letter of Apd, 1 5 to prepare
a memorandum advancing a. different view . If you, rrhuraood
and Harry a~e still of ' a mind to ~issent ~· and wish me . to do
so - ,I ;.wiJ) ! be lad · to pndertake the 'memor:andu'!' ·
' '!<l:i

'k: .~:J,;
~1,\'

ji

·.:t~··

!

"~

t

.~

1

'~ ~:~' ~;
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· :.:

l

,

.1

.iu;rttutt <!fcurl cf f!rt ~b .ita±t.s
:.uJri:tt\lht~ ~.
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C HAMBE;RS OF"

JUSTI CE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

May 31, 1983

No. 82-401

Rice v . Rehner

Dear Lewis,
It's very good of you to undertake
the memorandum in dissent. However, I
think I'll try my hand at one. Thanks
so much.

Sine~

Justice Powell
Copies to:
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun

·
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CHAMBERS OF

June 1, 1983

..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

.- .
Re:

82-401 - Rice v. Rehner

Dear Sandra,
I agree.

Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
cpm

~-

'·"'
~

; .. ~

:1'

.•

cc:

The Conference
'l

.'
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 3, 1983

No. 82-401, Rice v. Rehner

Re:

Dear Sandra:
I

join.

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference

/

.:§uprtmt <ijourl of tqt ~tlt .;§twa

11IasJringhm. !9. <ij. 21l~J!~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 28, 1983

Re:

No. 82-401-Rice v. Rehner

Dear Harry:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

/,m.
T.M.

Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

~

.§u:prtmt <!Jourl of tfrt 'J!htittb .§tidt.s'
Ji'MJri:ngt~ ~. <!J. 2.0bTJ!.~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE

w .. .

J . BRENNAN, JR .

June 29, 1983

No. 82-401
Rice v. Rehner

Dear Harry,
Please join me in your
dissent.
Sincerely,
/

. I

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

/

82-401

Rice v. Rehner (Mark)
SOC for the Court
1st draft 5/26/83
2nd draft 6/30/83
Joined by CJ, BRW, LFP, WHR, JPS
HAB dissent
Typed draft 6/27/83
1st printed draft 6/28/83
Joined by WJB, TM

